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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Charles Anthony Capone appeals from the judgment entered upon the
jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder, failure to notify coroner or
law enforcement of death, conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law
enforcement of death and a persistent violator enhancement.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Capone and Rachael Anderson started dating in February 2009 and were
married in September 2009.

(9/2/14 Tr., p. 846, Ls. 1-21.)

On or around

December 27, 2009, Rachael reported to the Clarkston Police Department that
Capone choked and attacked her. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 908, L. 15 – p. 909, L. 9; 9/4/14
Tr., p. 1187, L. 9 – p. 1188, L. 14.) Rachael then left Capone and filed for
divorce. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 846, L. 22 – p. 847, L. 5, p. 936, Ls. 9-24; 9/5/14 Tr., p.
1359, L. 10 – p. 1361, L. 6; Ex. 73.) The earliest the divorce could be finalized
was on or around April 12, 2010. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1363, L. 22 – p. 1364, L. 14.)
Capone did not want a divorce. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1004, L. 15 – p. 1006, L. 16.)
After Rachael filed for divorce, Robert Bogden, a friend of Capone’s, became
concerned that Capone would do something dangerous. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1079, L.
8 – p. 1080, L. 8.)
After Rachael left Capone, Rachael started receiving strange calls
multiple times a day. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 847, L. 8 – p. 856, L. 6; 9/3/14, p. 978, L. 15
– p. 979, L. 4, Tr., p. 1009, L. 17 – p. 1010, L. 3; Ex. 4.) The voice on the phone
calls was artificially distorted. (Id.) Rachael played some of the harassing phone
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messages to her younger sister, Kristina Bonefield. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 965, L. 1 – p.
966, L. 15, 9/3/14 Tr., p. 972, L. 14 – p. 974, L. 3; Exs. 4, 149.) Ms. Bonefield
described the voice on the phone messages as:
Distorted, like not a human voice, like something from a movie
almost, like scary. Like, it scared me. I didn’t – I told her I didn’t
want to hear it anymore; that it had scared me, like – not like you or
I would talk, like distorted, you know, an evil voice.
(9/2/14 Tr., p. 965, Ls. 3-10.)

The calls were made using a service called

“Spoof.com” which could change the voice of the caller and hide the phone
number of the caller. (See 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.)
Rachael also received anonymous emails with pictures of mutilated
bodies from old unsolved murder cases. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1057, L. 12 – p. 1058, L.
6.) She began to sleep with the lights on and started keeping a loaded gun in
her house. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 855, L. 23 – p. 857, L. 19.)
Rachael’s car, a white Dodge, was repeatedly vandalized. (9/2/14 Tr., p.
910, L. 10 – p. 911, L. 23, p. 914, Ls. 15-25, p. 936, L. 25 – p. 939, L. 23; 9/3/14
Tr., p. 976, L. 22 – p. 978, L. 1; Ex. 29.) Her car tire was slashed, her oil filter
loosened, and the back window broken out. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 910, L. 10 – p. 911, L.
23, p. 941, L. 12 – p. 942, L. 10; 9/3/14 Tr., p. 1010, L. 4 – p. 1013, L. 1.) For a
time, Rachael was not sure who was stalking and harassing her. (9/4/14 Tr., p.
1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 3.) Captain Hally of the Asotin County Sheriff’s Office
met with Rachael on April 13, 2010. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1170, Ls. 10-18.)

Rachael

was “scared, frightened, upset and very concerned for her safety.” (Id.)
Capone owned and operated a car repair shop called Palouse Multiple
Services or “PMS” in Moscow, Idaho. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1180, L. 5 – p. 1181, L. 11;
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Ex. 29.) After Rachael’s car was vandalized she took it to Capone’s auto shop to
get it fixed. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1064, L. 22 – p. 1065, L. 18.) Capone lent Rachael a
white Yukon to drive while her car was being fixed. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1097, L. 25 –
p. 1100, L. 3, p. 1122, Ls. 6-20, p. 1191, Ls. 5-10.) The white Yukon belonged to
Mr. Bogden. (Id.)
When Rachael told her friend, J.D. Rogers, that she was taking her car to
Capone’s shop to get it repaired, he told Rachael that she should not go by
herself. (9/3/14 Tr. p. 1063, L. 20 – p. 1066, L. 11.)
That week, Capone told Rachael that she had three days to decide
whether to stay married to him or get divorced. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1017, L. 20 – p.
1019, L. 6.) Capone wanted to meet with Rachael again on Friday, April 16,
2010, so she could give him her final answer. (Id.)
On April 16, 2010 Rachael went to Capone’s car shop. (9/4/14 Tr., p.
1189, L. 4 – p. 1191, L. 4.) When Rachael arrived, she was upset that her car
was not yet fixed. (Id.) Rachael then left Capone’s shop to buy a computer at
Office Depot. (Id.) Capone gave her his debit card to use. (Id.) Rachael went
into Office Depot a little after 6:00 p.m., stayed 20-30 minutes, but left with a
computer. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1261, L. 11 – p. 1264, L. 25, p. 1269, Ls. 11-21.)
Rachael then stopped by the Third Street Market and purchased a pack of
Grolsch beer using Capone’s debit card. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1191, L. 14 – p. 1193, L.
25; Ex. 10.) The receipt showed the purchase occurred at 7:07 p.m. (9/8/14 Tr.,
p. 1615, L. 7 – p. 1619, L. 1; Ex. 136.) She then returned to Capone’s shop.
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1191, L. 14 – p. 1193, L. 25; Ex. 10.)
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David Stone, an old friend of Capone’s, was at Capone’s shop because
Capone was going to work on Mr. Stone’s car, a Dodge Durango. (9/9/14 Tr., p.
1742, L. 5 – p. 1743, L. 22, p. 1759, Ls. 7-22.) When Rachael returned to
Capone’s shop, Capone drank some of the beer Rachael had purchased.
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1773, L. 16 – p. 1775, L. 11.) Later in the evening, Capone
finished working on Rachael’s car. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1775, L. 18 – p. 1778, L. 20.)
Capone pulled Rachael’s car out of the garage, and Mr. Stone had to drive his
car around and back into Capone’s shop. (Id.)
After Mr. Stone pulled his car into Capone’s shop, Mr. Stone heard a
noise, like a thud or a bang. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1778, L. 21 – p. 1782, L. 9.) Mr.
Stone walked around to see what was taking so long and he saw Rachael on the
ground and Capone straddling and strangling her.

(Id.)

Rachael was not

moving. (Id.) There was no sound. (Id.) Capone was wearing black shop
gloves. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1782, L. 12 – p. 1784, L. 1.)
Capone did not hear Mr. Stone walk up, so when Mr. Stone asked him
what was going on, it startled Capone. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1782, Ls. 10-25.) Capone
told Mr. Stone that they were in this together and told him he knew where his
family lived.

(Id.)

Capone and Mr. Stone opened the back of Mr. Stone’s

Durango, put the seats down, and laid down cardboard in the back. (9/9/14 Tr.,
p. 1788, L. 20 – p. 1791, L. 19.) They then put Rachael’s body on top of the
cardboard in the Durango and put some more cardboard and bags on top of her.
(Id.) After they closed the hatch to the Durango, Capone cleaned out the Yukon
that Rachael had been driving. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1793, L. 20 – p. 1795, L. 7.)
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Capone was still wearing the gloves. (Id.) Capone then took up Rachael’s purse
off the ground and put it in the Yukon. (Id.) Capone locked the shop and told
Mr. Stone to follow him. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p. 1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23,
127A.) Capone drove the Yukon to the Dyna Mart and parked it in back of the
Dyna Mart. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p. 1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23, 127A.) On the
way back to Capone’s shop, Capone was quiet, but he told Mr. Stone that
everything was going to be okay if he kept his mouth shut. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1801,
L. 23 – p. 1803, L. 17.) Capone instructed Mr. Stone to get a chain. (9/9/14 Tr.,
p. 1803, L. 18 – p. 1804, L. 24.)
Mr. Stone eventually obtained a chain and took it back to Capone’s shop,
where Capone had laid a tarp on the floor near the rear of the Durango. (9/9/14
Tr., p. 1804, L. 25 – p. 1817, L. 16; Exs. 121-124, 139.) Capone got one of the
tarps down from the loft. (Id.) They wrapped Rachael in the tarp and tied it with
the chain and a nylon-like rope. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 – p. 1821, L. 6.)
After Rachael’s body was secured in the tarp, Capone and Mr. Stone
placed her in the back of the Durango, covered her up, and closed the hatch.
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1821, L. 22 – p. 1822, L. 4.) They drove to Red Wolf Bridge and
eventually threw her over the side of the bridge into the river. (9/9/14 Tr., p.
1822, L. 5 – p. 1829, L. 14; Exs. 113, 141.)
When they were finished cleaning the Durango and the shop, Capone told
Mr. Stone to meet him at Shari’s restaurant for breakfast in the morning. (9/9/14
Tr., p. 1837, L. 1 – p. 1838, L. 8.) At breakfast, Capone reminded Mr. Stone to
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keep his mouth shut, and told him that if he kept his mouth shut nobody else
needed to get hurt. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1838, L. 9 – p. 1840, L. 2; Ex. 150.)
Rachael did not show up to work on Saturday or Monday and, over the
course of Monday, it became clear that she was missing. (See 9/2/14 Tr., p.
868, L. 14 – p. 869, L. 17; 9/2/14 Tr., p. 918, Ls. 3-21; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1175, Ls. 920.) When Captain Hally learned that Rachael was missing he became very
concerned because of their prior conversations. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1175, L. 11 – p.
1179, L. 3.)

Captain Hally contacted AT&T, Rachael’s cell phone service

provider, and requested an exigent circumstances ping of her cell phone. (Id.)
The ping location came back in Nez Perce County, in an area off of Warner
Road and Lindsay Creek Road. (Id.) The police were unsuccessful in finding
Rachael or her cell phone. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1179, Ls. 4-15.)
The next day, Tuesday, Ms. Bonefield asked Capone when he last saw
Rachael and Capone said she had come by on Friday, April 16, bought some
beer with his debit card, and then “ran off with some guy named Vince.” (9/3/14
Tr., p. 987, L. 7 – p. 989, L. 3.) There was no “guy named Vince.” (Id.)
That same day, Captain Hally interviewed Capone at his car repair shop.
Capone admitted that he had been stalking and harassing Rachael, and
admitted that he had used Spoof.com to change his voice and hide his phone
number. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.) Capone also admitted to
having a physical altercation with Rachael on December 27, 2009. (9/4/14 Tr., p.
1187, L. 9 – p. 1188, L. 14.) Capone further admitted Rachael had been at his
shop on April 16. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1189, L. 9 – p. 1195, L. 7.) He gave a couple of
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different times that she left his shop, but eventually settled on the story that she
left around 7:00 p.m. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1194, L. 20 – p. 1195, L. 7.) According to
Capone, Rachael left his shop and went to another computer store, Crazy
Computers, but did not return after that. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1195, Ls. 8-22.) Capone
never mentioned Mr. Stone being present at his shop on April 16. (9/4/14 Tr., p.
1196, L. 13 – p. 1197, L. 14.)
Capone told the police they could search his shop and his pickup. (9/4/14
Tr., p. 1203, L. 22 – p. 1205, L. 4.) Lieutenant Fry found a box of black latex
gloves in Capone’s pickup. (Id.) While the police were at his shop, Capone
became agitated and said something along the lines of “it wasn’t supposed to
turn out like this” and then told the police to leave. (Id.)
The next day, Wednesday, April 21, 2010, Rachael’s family and friends
were putting up missing person posters when they saw the white Yukon that
Rachael had been driving, parked behind the Dyna Mart. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 878, L. 1
– p. 880, L. 5.) Rachael also made it a habit to hide her purse in her car, so Ms.
Griswold was surprised to see Rachael’s purse sitting in the open in the Yukon.
(9/2/14 Tr., p. 880, L. 9 – p. 881, L. 2; Ex. 17.)
Rachael’s family continually searched for Rachael, but Capone never
helped. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 954, Ls. 8-17; 9/3/14 Tr., p. 987, L. 7 – p. 989, L. 3, p.
1114, Ls. 3-21, p. 1139, Ls. 13-18; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1239, Ls. 7-15.)
On May 6, 2010, Capone was arrested on federal gun charges. (9/8/14
Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-12.) While he was in custody he made several incriminating
admissions regarding Rachael to his cellmates, Mr. Glass and Mr. Voss. (See
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e.g. 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1427, L. 23 – p. 1432, L. 20, p. 1442, L. 14 – p. 1444, L. 4, p.
1457, Ls. 2-6, p. 1459, L. 21 – p. 1460, L. 13.)
On May 1, 2013, after an investigation, the state charged Capone with
first degree murder and related charges.
Stone was also charged.

(See R., pp. 128-133, 241-247.) Mr.

(See R., pp. 304-307.)

After a joint preliminary

hearing, while the deputies were removing handcuffs and leg irons, Capone
turned to Mr. Stone and said, “I don’t even know why you’re in here.” (9/9/14 Tr.,
p. 1853, L. 21 – p. 1859, L. 6; 9/11/14 Tr., p. 2287, L. 20 – p. 2289, L. 22.) Mr.
Stone became emotional and eventually asked to speak to his attorney. (See
9/9/14 Tr., p. 1853, L. 21 – p. 1859, L. 12.) Mr. Stone told his attorney that he
needed to do the right thing. (Id.) There was no plea deal offered by the state
the first time he spoke to investigators. (Id) Eventually, Mr. Stone entered into a
plea agreement with the state in which Mr. Stone agreed to plead guilty to failure
to notify law enforcement or coroner of death, and the remaining counts against
him were dismissed without prejudice. (R., pp. 442-445.)
The district court granted the state leave to amend the Information based
upon the evidence provided by Mr. Stone. (R., pp. 439-445, 448-449). The
amended Information charged Capone with first degree murder, failure to notify
coroner or law enforcement of death, conspiracy to commit failure to notify
coroner or law enforcement of death and the persistent violator enhancement.
(R., pp. 450-455, 1620-1622, 1642-1647.)
The state filed a Notice of Intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, including
Capone’s harassment and stalking of Rachael, his vandalism of her car, his
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attempted strangulation of Rachael, and his prior felony convictions and
incarcerations. (R., pp. 456-458.) The state also filed a series of motions in
limine.

(R., pp. 475-508.)

Capone filed a motion in limine to exclude the

proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp. 509-512.)
The district court held a hearing on the pre-trial motions and entered a
written order. (R., pp. 1553-1556, 1571-1574.) The district court deferred ruling
on the admissibility of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence until trial. (R., p. 1556 (“Court
stated that the motions in limine in regard to the 404(b) evidence will have to be
dealt with at trial.”).)
Prior to trial, both the state and Capone proposed jury instructions. (R.,
pp. 1701-1735, 1750-1756.) Capone did not propose a jury instruction regarding
accomplice testimony, nor did Capone object to the lack of such an instruction.
(See R., pp. 1750-1756.)

At trial, Capone did not object to the final jury

instructions. (R., pp. 1964, 1977 – 2019.)
Following a 16 day jury trial (R., pp. 1856-1858, 1861-1868, 1875-1889,
1896-1905, 1912-1922, 1933-1944, 1948-1952, 1955-1970), the jury found
Capone guilty of all charges. (9/17/14 Tr., p. 2692, L. 24 – p. 2694, L. 8, p.
2705, L. 19 – p. 2706, L. 5; R., pp. 2020-2022.)
The district court imposed a fixed life sentence for first degree murder,
and 20 years fixed for both failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death
and conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death,
which are to be served consecutively to each other, but concurrently to the
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murder sentence. (R., pp. 2091-2095.) Capone filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
(R., pp. 2096-2098.)
While his appeal was pending Capone filed a Motion for New Trial, based
upon a report by Deputy Demyer in which he reported that he obtained a
statement from a Tyler Beyer who was being booked into jail with a .20 BAC.
(See Jan. 7, 2016 Motion for New Trial 1; Aug. R., pp. 1-7.) Reportedly, in July of
2013, Mr. Stone told Mr. Beyer that “they” would “never find [Rachael’s] body in
the river because it was not there.” (Id.)
The district court denied Capone’s motion for a new trial, finding that the
statement purportedly made by Mr. Stone to Mr. Beyer was not material and
would have been admissible only for the purposes of impeachment. (Aug. R.,
pp. 29-35.) Further, this statement would not have provided sufficient evidence
to change the jury verdict. (Id.) The district court found, “There was substantial
evidence presented to the jury which supported the finding of guilt in this matter.”
(Id.)

1

The December 13, 2016 Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record,
augmented the record with: 1. Motion for New Trial, file-stamped January 7,
2016; 2. Memorandum of Authorities in Support of a Motion for New Trial, with
attachment, file-stamped January 7, 2016; 3. State’s Response to “Motion for a
New Trial,” with attachments, file-stamped January 21, 2016; and 4. Opinion and
Order on Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial, file-stamped May 10, 2016.
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ISSUES
Capone states the issues on appeal as:
I.

II.

III.
IV.

V.
VI.

WHETHER THE GUILTY VERDICTS WERE SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICENT EVIDENCE AND WHETHER THE ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY WAS CORROBORATED
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE REQUIREMENT THAT ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY MUST BE CORROBORATED
WHETHER THE 404(B) EVIDENCE WAS IMPROPERLY
ADMITTED
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO
ALLOW TWO DIFFERENT STATE’S WITNESSES TO BE
IMPEACHED WITH THEIR BURGLARLY CONVICTIONS THAT
WERE LESS THAN 10 YEARS OLD
WHETHER REVERSAL IS REQUIRED TO CUMULATIVE ERROR
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Capone failed to show that Mr. Stone was an accomplice to
murder in the first degree and has Capone failed to show the jury lacked
sufficient evidence to convict?
2.
Has Capone failed to show the district court committed
fundamental error by not instructing the jury regarding the corroboration
requirement for accomplice testimony?
3.
Did Capone fail to preserve for appeal his challenges to evidence
that was admitted at trial without objection; and has Capone otherwise failed to
show the district court abused its discretion when it admitted certain evidence
over Capone’s evidentiary objections?
4.
Has Capone failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it excluded evidence of two witnesses’ prior felony convictions?
5.

Has Capone failed to show error, much less cumulative error?

6.
Has Capone failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion for a new trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Jury Had More Than Sufficient Evidence To Convict Capone Of The
Charged Crimes
A.

Introduction
Capone argues that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to convict

him of any of the charges because Mr. Stone was an accomplice whose
testimony was uncorroborated. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-19.) Contrary to
Capone’s assertion on appeal, Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to murder,
because his mere presence during the commission of the crime was insufficient
to make him an accomplice.

Further, even assuming Mr. Stone was an

accomplice, the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate Mr. Stone’s
testimony and establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements of
all the charged crimes.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.”

State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 376, 382, 195 P.3d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 2008). “A
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing State v.
Horejs, 143 Idaho 260, 263, 141 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Ct. App. 2006); State v.
Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State
v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 572, 826 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct. App. 1992)).
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The appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Id. (citations omitted)).
Further, the appellate court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution. Id. (citation omitted).

C.

Mr. Stone Was Not An Accomplice To First Degree Murder
On appeal, Capone assumes that Mr. Stone was an accomplice to all

three felonies. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-19.) Based upon this assumption,
Capone argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of all three crimes
because, Capone claims, there was no corroboration for the accomplice’s
testimony as required by Idaho Code § 19-2117. (See id.)
Capone has failed to show that the state was required to present evidence
to corroborate Mr. Stone’s testimony implicating Capone in the murder charge.
A review of the record and the applicable law shows Mr. Stone was not an
accomplice to that crime. Idaho Code § 19-2117 states:
A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice,
unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the
corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of
the offense, or the circumstances thereof.
I.C. § 19-2117.
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 313 defines an accomplice as someone
who promotes or assists in the commission of a crime:
An accomplice is a person who intends to promote or assist in the
commission of a crime and who either directly commits the acts
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constituting the crime or who, before or during its commission, aids,
assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits,
invites, helps or hires another to commit the crime. Mere presence
at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or
commission of a crime is not in the absence of a duty to act
sufficient to make one an accomplice.
ICJI 313 (brackets omitted); see also State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 484, 974
P.2d 1109, 1113 (Ct. App. 1999); I.C. § 19-1430 (“all persons concerned in the
commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, or aid and abet in its commission” are principals). “A bystander’s mere
acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the commission of an offense, however
reprehensible the crime may be, is not sufficient to make that person an
accomplice.” State v. Ruiz, 115 Idaho 12, 17, 764 P.2d 89, 94 (Ct. App. 1988)
(citing State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Adair, 99 Idaho 703, 587 P.2d 1238 (1978)); see also ICJI 313. Being indicted in
the same case is also not enough to make someone an accomplice. See State
v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 452, 872 P.2d 708, 715 (1994).
Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, it is clear Mr. Stone
was not an accomplice to Rachael’s murder. Mr. Stone saw Capone strangling
Rachael, but did not in any way promote, encourage or assist Capone in killing
her. (See 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1778, L. 21 – p. 1782, L. 25.) Mr. Stone was merely a
bystander which is insufficient to render him an accomplice. Compare State v.
Ruiz, 115 Idaho at 17, 764 P.2d at 94 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding presence during
the crime and moving a vehicle fell short of establishing accomplice liability).
While Mr. Stone’s apparent acquiescence to Rachael’s murder is reprehensible,
it does not make him an accomplice to murder.
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That Mr. Stone assisted with disposing of Rachael’s body and failed to
report her death also does not make him an accomplice to murder. (See, e.g.,
9/9/14 Tr., p. 1821, L. 22 – p. 1829, L. 14, p. 1850, L. 16 – p. 1871, L. 16; Exs.
113, 141.) A person who knows a felony was committed and willfully conceals it
from the police can be an accessory.

See ICJI 310. It is well established,

however, that “[a]n accessory after the fact is not an accomplice.”

State v.

Grimmett, 33 Idaho 203, 193 P. 380, 382-83 (1920); see also State v. McCabe,
101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); State v. Murphy, 94 Idaho 849,
851, 499 P.2d 548, 550 (1972). The testimony of an accessory after the fact is
not accomplice testimony and does not require corroboration. See McCabe, 101
Idaho at 729, 620 P.2d at 302. Since Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to first
degree murder the corroboration requirements of Idaho Code § 19-2117 are not
applicable to Capone’s conviction for first degree murder.

D.

Even If Mr. Stone Was An Accomplice To First Degree Murder, There
Was Corroboration By Other Evidence Which Tended To Connect
Capone With The Commission Of That Crime
Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to first degree murder. Even if he was

an accomplice the state presented corroborating evidence sufficient to satisfy
Idaho Code § 19-2117. On appeal, Capone cites to the closing arguments of
counsel to argue there was insufficient evidence to convict him. (See Appellant’s
brief, p. 11.) Capone’s argument is primarily a request for the appellate court to
reweigh the testimony presented to the jury. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-18.)
Contrary to Capone’s argument on appeal, the jury had sufficient evidence and
more than enough corroboration.
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Corroborating evidence need not be sufficient to sustain a conviction on
its own, nor must the evidence corroborate every detail of the accomplice’s
testimony. State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630, 97 P.3d 1014, 1019 (2004) (citing
State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 364, 690 P.2d 293, 299 (1984); State v.
Campbell, 114 Idaho 367, 370, 757 P.2d 230, 233 (Ct. App. 1988); Matthews v.
State, 136 Idaho 46, 50, 28 P.3d 387, 391 (Ct. App. 2001)). “Corroboration of an
accomplice need only connect the accused with the crime, it may be slight, and
need only go to one material fact or it may be entirely circumstantial.” State v.
Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 486, 873 P.2d 122, 131 (1994) (citing Aragon, 107 Idaho
at 364, 690 P.2d at 299; State v. Mundell, 66 Idaho 339, 158 P.2d 799 (1945)).
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony.
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 376, 382-383, 195 P.3d 737, 741-742 (Ct. App.
2008).
Statements attributable to the defendant may serve as the necessary
corroboration. State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 892, 216 P.3d 648, 650 (Ct. App.
2009) (citing Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 382-383, 195 P.3d at 741-742). “Even a
highly plausible innocent explanation of the evidence ‘does not strip the evidence
of its corroborative character.’” Id. at 893, 216 P.3d at 651 (citing Hill, 140 Idaho
at 630, 97 P.3d at 1019).
There was corroborating evidence connecting Capone to the crime,
including statements made by Capone. Mr. Voss testified that Capone told him
that Rachael had gone away before and then come back, but this time she was
not coming back. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1427, L. 23 – p. 1431, L. 6.) Capone also told
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Mr. Voss that he would not be convicted for Rachael’s murder because “they” will
never find her body. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1442, L. 14 – p. 1444, L. 4.)
Mr. Glass testified that Capone told him that Rachael “ain’t doing nothing
but pushing up daisies.” (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1455, L. 20 – p. 1456, L. 12.) Capone
also told Mr. Glass that Rachael was a “bitch” and “they would never find the
body.” (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1457, Ls. 2-6.) Mr. Glass also testified that Capone said, “I
buried the fuckin’ bitch so deep they’ll never find her,” and told him several
different versions about the last time he saw Rachael. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1460, Ls.
1-8, p. 1466, Ls. 17-25.) Capone also told Mr. Glass that Rachael might turn him
in for having guns, and he could go to prison. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 1-11.)
Capone said that Rachael was a “bitch” and that “he’d end it all before he’d lose
everything again.” (Id.)
Chelsea Dahl testified that, about a week before Rachael disappeared,
Capone was very upset because Rachael missed a marriage counseling
session. (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1568, L. 9 – p. 1569, L. 11.) Capone told Ms. Dahl that
Rachael did not “know who she fucked with because I can make people
disappear.” (Id.)
Captain Hally testified that Capone admitted to stalking and harassing
Rachael. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.) Capone admitted he used
Spoof.com to change his voice and hide his phone number. (Id.) When the
detectives approached Capone at his shop, shortly after Rachael went missing,
Capone became emotional and said something along the lines of “it wasn’t
supposed to happen like this.” (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1236, L. 5 – p. 1238, L. 6.)
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Mr. Stone testified that Capone was wearing black gloves while he
strangled Rachael. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1782, L. 12 – p. 1784, L. 1.) Lieutenant Fry
found a box of black gloves in Capone’s pickup, and a search of the Yukon that
Rachael was driving uncovered a piece of a black glove in the passenger seat.
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1203, L. 22 – p. 1205, L. 4, p. 1327, Ls. 16-23, p. 1335, L. 8 – p.
1338, L. 23; Exs. 98-100.)

Capone’s DNA was a major contributor on the

outside glove tip, and Capone’s DNA was present at a higher amount than any
other DNA. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1387, L. 18 – p. 1389, L. 15, p. 1389, L. 25 – p. 1390,
L. 17.)
Mr. Stone testified that, on the night of the murder, he stayed inside the
shop while Capone went outside to speak with Rachael several times. (9/8/14
Tr., p. 1771, L. 21 – p. 1775, L. 11.) Tim Fountain, who lived near Capone’s
repair shop, testified he saw a woman and a man in a confrontation outside of
Capone’s shop on April 16, 2010. (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1696, L. 2 – p. 1706, L. 14; Exs.
117-120.) Both Mr. Stone and Mr. Fountain heard a loud noise from Capone’s
shop that same evening. (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1696, L. 2 – p. 1706, L. 14; 9/9/14 Tr., p.
1778, L. 21 – p. 1782, L. 9.)
After the murder, Capone took up Rachael’s purse off the ground and put
it in the Yukon. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1793, L. 20 – p. 1795, L. 7.)

When the Yukon

was found by the Dyna Mart, Rachael’s purse was sitting in plain view in the
vehicle and where Rachael would never have left it. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 880, L. 9 – p.
881, L. 2; 9/3/14 Tr., p. 990, Ls. 14-20; Ex. 17.)
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Louis Soule testified that he saw Capone on the evening of Friday, April
16, 2010, with the white Yukon that Rachael was previously driving. (9/8/14 Tr.,
p. 1673, L. 3 – p. 1681, L. 14, p. 1690, L. 3 – p. 1693, L. 18; Ex. 11.) Capone
was walking quickly and ignoring Mr. Soule, which was unusual. (Id.)
Cell phone tower data also corroborated Mr. Stone’s testimony. Evidence
from the cell phone towers used by Rachael’s cell phone throughout Friday, April
16, 2010, showed her movements from Capone’s shop to the Office Depot in
Moscow, to the store where she bought the Groslch beer, and then back to
Capone’s shop. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2236, L. 14 – 2250, L. 2; Exs. 140.3 – 140.25.)
The last voice phone call from Rachael’s phone was at 8:09 p.m. to Dennis
Plunkett’s cell phone. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2244, L. 19 – p. 2246, L. 16; Exs. 140.20140.21.) This call used the Paradise Ridge Tower in Moscow, Idaho. (Id.) The
Paradise Ridge Tower is the tower closest to Capone’s shop. (Id.) Rachael’s
phone also received a text message using that same tower at 8:27 p.m. (Id.)
Capone’s own cell phone records also corroborated Mr. Stone’s
testimony. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2250, L. 3 – p. 2251, L. 6; Exs. 140.26-140.28.) The
records show that Capone’s cell phone was also using the Paradise Ridge
Tower. (Id.) Capone’s cell phone logged 29 phone calls between 4:12 p.m. and
7:30 p.m., on April 16, 2010, and during all 29 calls his cell phone used the
Paradise Ridge Tower. (Id.) From 9:57 p.m. to 10:50 p.m., Capone’s cell phone
also used the Paradise Ridge Tower. (Id.)
Further, records show that Mr. Stone’s cell phone also used the Paradise
Ridge Tower throughout the day and evening of April 16, 2010, including phone
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calls at 7:19 p.m. and 8:40 p.m. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2251, L. 7 – p. 2252, L. 15; Exs.
140.29-140.32.) In addition, the decrease in cell phone activities for Capone,
Rachael and Mr. Stone’s cell phones corroborated Mr. Stone’s testimony.
(9/11/14 Tr., p. 2253, L. 9 – p. 2254, L.1; Exs. 140.35-140.36.)
Capone’s behavior after the murder also provides circumstantial evidence
that supports Mr. Stone’s testimony. After Rachael separated from him, Capone
stayed with his friend, Mr. Bogden. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1075, L. 8 – p. 1077, L. 13.)
Mr. Bogden’s wife, Carole Bogden, testified that Capone was not home by
midnight on Friday, April 16, 2010, and she did not see him when she woke up at
8:00 a.m. on Saturday. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1135, L. 24 – p. 1138, L. 9.) She also
testified that when she finally saw Capone on Saturday, he was acting unusual.
(Id.)
John Houser, the pastor at Capone’s church, testified that on the Sunday
following the murder, Capone’s actions were “very unusual.”

(9/3/14 Tr., p.

1150, L. 21 – p. 1153, L. 10.) Capone wore sunglasses in church and he got up
and left while Pastor Houser was teaching. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1151, L. 6 – p. 1153,
L. 10.)
Shortly after Rachael disappeared, Mr. Bogden asked Capone if he had
anything to do with Rachael’s disappearance. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1110, L. 17, p.
1111, L. 24.) Capone did not answer. (Id.) Mr. Bogden explained that they
were driving around for five hours talking and, during that long conversation, Mr.
Bogden asked Capone a specific question:
And so I went to – my advice to him was, well – I asked him
specifically, if you have any – do you have anything to do with

20

Rachael’s disappearance? And he didn’t – didn’t answer. He said,
that’s what my family asked. And I said, no way. But he didn’t
answer me directly.
(9/3/14 Tr., p. 1111, Ls. 8-13.)
Finally, Rachael’s family was continually searching for Rachael, but
Capone never helped look for her. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 954, Ls. 8-17; 9/3/14 Tr., p.
987, L. 7 – p. 989, L. 3, p. 1114, Ls. 3-21, p. 1139, Ls. 13-18; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1239,
Ls. 7-15.)
While Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to first degree murder, there was
evidence corroborating his testimony.

The jury had sufficient competent

evidence to find Capone guilty of first degree murder.

E.

There Was Corroboration Of Mr. Stone’s Testimony Which Tended To
Connect Capone To Failure To Report Death And Conspiracy To Commit
Failure To Report Death Charges
Mr. Stone pled guilty to conspiring to fail to report Rachael’s death to the

coroner or law enforcement. (See R., pp. 442-445.) Mr. Stone admitted aiding
Capone in disposing of Rachael’s body and lying to help him cover it up. While
Mr. Stone was likely an accomplice to the failure to notify coroner or law
enforcement of death, and conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law
enforcement of death charges, there was substantial testimony corroborating his
testimony regarding these charges.
As noted above, corroboration accomplice testimony need only connect
the accused with the crime, it may be slight, and need only go to one material
fact or it may be entirely circumstantial.” Jones, 125 Idaho at 486, 873 P.2d at
131 (citations omitted). In addition to the evidence and admissions by Capone
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noted in section I.D. above, there is additional corroborating evidence connecting
Capone to the failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death and
conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death
charges
Mr. Stone testified that he and Capone wrapped Rachael’s body in a tarp.
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 – p. 1821, L. 6.) Nathan Donner testified that he used
to help Capone at his shop and he testified that the two tarps in the loft of
Capone’s shop had overspray on them from paint. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1506, L. 2 – p.
1507, L. 5, p. 1515, L. 11 – p. 1516, L. 11, p. 1531, Ls. 9-22; Ex. 61, 64.)
However, after Rachael was murdered, and when the police took pictures of the
tarps, one of the tarps was new and did not have paint on it. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1317,
L. 15 – p. 1318, L. 11; Exs. 63-65.)
Brian Spence testified that, in January 2007, Capone opened a charge
account with Spence Hardware. (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1631, L. 18 – p. 1633, L. 4.) On
the morning of Saturday, April 17, 2010, the day after the murder, Capone
purchased a 12 x 20 green brown tarp and then asked to close his account.
(9/8/14 Tr., p. 1633, L. 5 – p. 1639, L. 4; Ex. 114.) The tarp Capone purchased
looked like the new tarp the police found in Capone’s shop. (Id.)
Mr. Glass testified that, during a conversation he had with Capone,
Capone said that if he was going to kill someone he would put them in a tarp and
cut them so there would be no DNA evidence. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1457, L. 14 – p.
1458, L. 5.)
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Mr. Stone testified that, after the murder, Capone locked the shop and
told Mr. Stone to follow him in Capone’s truck. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p.
1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23, 127A.) Capone drove the Yukon and parked it on the
back side of the Dyna Mart. (Id.) Detective Sergeant Aston testified that he
reviewed video footage taken from the Dyna Mart on April 16, 2010, and saw a
truck similar to Capone’s truck drive eastbound on Highway 128 at approximately
9:20 p.m. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2193, L. 3 – p. 2201, L. 14; Exs. 127A-D.)
Alisa Anderson, Mr. Stone’s ex-wife, testified that Mr. Stone came home
on the night of Friday, April 16, 2010, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., and he was
driving Capone’s pickup. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2125, L. 19 – p. 2130, L. 25.) She also
testified that he then left and did not come home until around 12:30 a.m. (Id.)
Mr. Stone also testified that he and Capone used the Durango to transport
Rachael’s body. (See 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1788, L. 20 – p. 1791, L. 19.) The video
footage taken from the Dyna Mart showed two vehicles that resembled the
Durango driving on the highway at approximately 11:21 p.m. and 11:46 p.m.
(9/11/14 Tr., p. 2201, L. 15 – p. 2214, L. 10; Exs. 128-131, 132A-B, 133A-B.)
Mr. Stone testified that Capone drove the Yukon to the Dyna Mart.
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p. 1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23, 127A.) Deborah Stamper,
who worked at the Dyna Mart did not see the Yukon when she went to work at
11:00 p.m. (9/15/14 Tr., p. 2504, L. 13 – p. 2507, L. 16.) However, on April 21,
2010, the Yukon was found parked near the Dyna Mart. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 878, L. 1
– p. 880, L. 5.) The police also found a piece of paper with Rachael’s blood on it
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on the floorboard of the Yukon tucked underneath the front passenger seat.
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1338, L. 24 – p. 1341, L. 6; Exs. 101, 102A, 102B.)
Detective Mooney testified that the police examined the position of the
driver’s seat in the Yukon. (Id.) (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1343, L. 6 – p. 1346, L. 4; Exs.
105-108.) Rachael was 5’4” tall. (Id.) Detective Mooney got another 5’4” female
to sit in the Yukon’s driver’s seat and determined that a woman of Rachael’s
height could not comfortably drive the Yukon with the driver’s seat in the position
it was found. (Id.) Capone is 5’10” tall. (Id.) The driver’s seat was in a much
better position for a 5’10” male than it was for the 5’4” female. (Id.)
Mr. Stone also testified that Capone instructed him to get a chain. (9/9/14
Tr., p. 1801, L. 23 – p. 1803, L. 17.) Mr. Stone went to his place of work, the City
of Moscow, and got a long chain from a scrap iron pile. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1806, L. 8
– p. 1816, L. 13; Exs. 121-124, 139.) Capone and Mr. Stone used that chain to
help wrap Rachael’s body in the tarp. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 – p. 1821, L. 6.)
Rick Benjamin, a fleet supervisor with the City of Moscow, testified the city has a
scrap iron pile where old tire chains are placed, and they do not take inventory of
that scrap iron. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2115, L. 14 – p. 2117, L. 5.)
The day after the murder, Mr. Stone and Capone met at Shari’s
restaurant. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1838, L. 9 – p. 1840, L. 2.) During this meal Capone
reminded Mr. Stone to keep his mouth shut about Rachael’s death. (Id.) The
state introduced into evidence a receipt showing that Mr. Stone paid for
breakfast at Shari’s Restaurant at 11:11 a.m. Saturday, April 17, 2010. (Ex. 150.)
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In addition, there was corroborating evidence that neither Capone nor Mr.
Stone reported Rachael’s death to law enforcement or the coroner.

Latah

County Coroner Catherine Mabbutt testified that neither Capone nor Mr. Stone
reported Rachael’s death. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2285, L. 16 – p. 2286, L. 21.) Neither
Capone nor Mr. Stone made any reports to law enforcement that Rachael was
dead. (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1619, Ls. 2-10, p. 1655, Ls. 18-22.) Further, Rachael’s
family was continually searching for Rachael, but Capone never helped look for
her. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1114, Ls. 3-21, p. 1139, Ls. 13-18; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1239, Ls. 715.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, there is more
than the slight and circumstantial evidence necessary to corroborate Mr. Stone’s
accomplice testimony. Capone has failed to show the jury did not have sufficient
evidence to convict him of the charged crimes.

II.
The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error When It Did Not Instruct
The Jury Regarding Accomplice Corroboration

A.

Introduction
Capone did not request, or object to the lack of, a jury instruction

regarding accomplice testimony corroboration at trial. (See Appellant’s brief, p.
10.)

On appeal, Capone argues the lack of such a jury instruction is

fundamental error. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) Capone’s argument fails
all three prongs of the fundamental error test.
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First, corroboration of accomplice testimony is a statutory requirement, not
a constitutional right. Second, the alleged error was not clear from the record
because it is not clear Mr. Stone was an accomplice to first degree murder.
Third, even if it was error to not give the instruction, the error was harmless
because there was evidence that corroborated Mr. Stone’s testimony. Capone
has failed to show fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a party fails to object to the jury instructions the appellate court

reviews the instructions for fundamental error. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,
588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011).

Fundamental error is an error that “so

profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the
accused of his fundamental right to due process.” State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842,
844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). In order to constitute fundamental error the
defendant must show that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

C.

Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental
Error By Not Instructing The Jury Regarding The Statutory Requirement
That Accomplice Testimony Be Corroborated
Capone did not object to the lack of a jury instruction regarding

accomplice testimony corroboration. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) On appeal,
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Capone argues the lack of jury instruction amounted to fundamental error. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-18.) Capone’s argument fails all three prongs of the
fundamental error test.
1.

Capone Has Failed To Establish The Lack Of An Instruction On
Accomplice Corroboration Violated An Unwaived Constitutional
Right

The requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is not a
constitutional right.

Rather, the requirement for corroboration of accomplice

testimony stems from Idaho Code § 19-2117, a statute. Fundamental error only
applies to unwaived constitutional rights; a defendant cannot satisfy the first
prong of the fundamental error test by alleging a violation of a statutory right.
See State v. Moore, 158 Idaho 943, 947, 354 P.3d 505, 509 (Ct. App. 2015).
Unobjected to jury instructions can be subject to fundamental error review if the
jury instructions violate due process by failing to require the state to prove every
element of the charged offense. State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 444, 224 P.3d
509, 511 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).) Here, Capone does not argue, nor
could he show, that accomplice corroboration is a necessary element of the
crimes for which he was convicted. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-18.) Because
corroboration of accomplice testimony is a statutory right, not a constitutional
right, Capone’s unpreserved claim of instructional error fails the first prong of the
Perry fundamental error analysis.

2.

Capone Has Failed To Establish It Was Clear Error To Not Instruct
The Jury Regarding The Requirement For Corroboration Of
Accomplice Testimony
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Even if Capone had an unwaived constitutional right to a jury instruction
based upon a statute, the error is not clear from the record. First, it is not clear
from the record that Mr. Stone was an accomplice to murder. (See § I.D., supra)
Therefore, there is no clear error regarding the failure to instruct on the
accomplice testimony corroboration requirement in relation to the murder charge.
It is also not clear from the record that trial counsel’s failure to request, or
object to a lack of, a jury instruction on corroboration of accomplice testimony
was not a tactical decision. An error plainly exists if the error is clear from the
record and there is not any need for additional information, including information
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho
at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
It appears that part of Capone’s trial strategy was to persuade the jury that
Mr. Stone was lying about everything, including that a murder even occurred and
that there was a cover up of this murder. Capone’s trial counsel spent a great
deal of time on cross-examination questioning Mr. Stone’s credibility. (9/9/14 Tr.,
p. 1872, L. 23 – p. 1920, L. 25; 9/10/14 Tr., p. 1925, L. 3 – p. 2093, L 4.)
Capone’s trial counsel repeatedly questioned Mr. Stone’s actions and words
after the murder to cast doubt on whether he actually witnessed Capone murder
Rachael at all. (See e.g. 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1890, Ls. 8-11; 9/10/14 Tr., p. 1931, Ls.
11-19.)
Under the theory that Mr. Stone was lying about the existence of a
murder, there was no crime for which Mr. Stone and Capone would be
accomplices. The pattern accomplice corroboration jury instruction either would
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have instructed the jury that Mr. Stone was an accomplice as a matter of law, or
would have required the jury to determine whether Mr. Stone was an accomplice.
See ICJI 313. If the district court had instructed the jury that Mr. Stone and
Capone were accomplices, or that they could be accomplices, such could have
undermined the defense’s strategy because the instruction carries an underlying
assumption that there was a crime committed for which Mr. Stone could be an
accomplice. If Capone committed no crime, as was the defense’s theory, there
was no need for the accomplice corroboration jury instruction.
Further, the accomplice corroboration jury instruction would not have
provided much benefit to Capone.

The pattern instruction states that the

corroborating evidence need only be “slight” and need only “tend[] to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime.” See ICJI 313. As noted above,
there was more than enough corroborating evidence presented to the jury. If the
district court had given this jury instruction it could have undermined part of the
defense’s strategy and would have provided minimal benefit to Capone’s
defense. Based upon this record, the decision to not request an accomplice
corroboration jury instruction may have been a tactical decision, and, as such,
the alleged error is not clear error and Capone fails the second prong of the
fundamental error analysis.

3.

Capone Has Failed To Establish Any Error Was Not Harmless

Even if it was error to not instruct the jury regarding the requirement that
accomplice testimony be corroborated, the error was harmless.

An error in

failing to give the jury an instruction regarding accomplice testimony may be
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harmless if ample corroborative evidence was presented.

State v. Hill, 140

Idaho 625, 630, 97 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Scroggins,
110 Idaho 380, 385–86, 716 P.2d 1152, 1157–58 (1985)). The corroborating
evidence need only tend to connect the defendant to the crime and is sufficient
even if it does not corroborate the accomplice’s version of the facts.

See

Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 385–86, 716 P.2d at 1157–58 (“Hence, although
[defendant’s] testimony did not corroborate [accomplice’s] version of the facts, it
was sufficient to permit a finding that Scroggins was connected with the
commission of the offense.”).
Here, there was substantial corroborating evidence regarding first degree
murder (see § I.D., supra) and both the failure to notify coroner or law
enforcement of death, and conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law
enforcement of death (see § I.E. supra). Capone cannot show there was any
violation of an unwaived constitutional right, nor can he show that any error was
clear from the record, and not harmless.

III.
Capone Failed To Object To Most Of The Purported I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence And
The District Court Did Not Err In Overruling The Objections Capone Did Make
A.

Introduction
The state filed a notice of intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.

456-458.) Capone filed a motion in limine to exclude the proposed I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence. (R., pp. 509-512.)

The district court deferred ruling on the I.R.E.

404(b) issues until trial. (R., p. 1556.) However, at trial, Capone objected to only
some of the evidence he had previously moved to exclude. (See 9/3/14 Tr., p.
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1002, L. 1 – p. 1006, L. 16, p. 1082, L. 7 – p. 1085, L. 4; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1432, L.
21 – p. 1433, L. 7). The district court overruled those objections. (See id.)
On appeal, Capone argues that all of the purported I.R.E. 404(b) evidence
he moved to exclude in his motion in limine should not have been admitted.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-29.) Since the district court deferred ruling on the
motion in limine until trial, Capone was required to make contemporaneous
objections during trial to preserve the issues. Because Capone failed to object to
the admission of much of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence at trial, his challenge to the
admission of that evidence is not properly before this Court.

As to the

evidentiary issues he did preserve by way of specific objection before the trial
court, Capone has failed to show error.

B.

Standard Of Review
When determining the admissibility of evidence to which an I.R.E. 404(b)

objection has been made, the trial court must first determine whether there is
sufficient evidence of the other acts that a reasonable jury could believe the
conduct actually occurred. I.R.E. 404(b). If so, then the court must consider: (1)
whether the other acts are relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning
the crime charged, other than propensity; and (2) whether the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Grist,
147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2008).
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C.

Capone Only Preserved For Appeal The Admissibility Of I.R.E. 404(b)
Evidence To Which He Specifically Objected At Trial
On appeal, Capone argues that I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was improperly

admitted. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-29.) Capone’s argument on appeal
assumes that the admissibility of all of this I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was objected
to and therefore preserved for appeal. (See id.) This is incorrect.
Prior to trial the state filed a notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence. (R., pp. 456-457.) Capone filed a motion in limine to exclude the
proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, and the district court held a hearing on the
defense’s motion in limine. (R., pp. 509-512, 1553-1556.) The district court
deferred ruling on Capone’s motion. (R., p. 1556.)
On appeal, Capone claims that at the April 9, 2014 hearing, the district
court granted part of his motion in limine to exclude I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and
precluded the state from presenting evidence of Capone’s May 6, 2010 arrest on
gun charges.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23.)

This claim is based on a

misreading of the record. The district court’s comments at the April 9, 2014
hearing, on which Capone’s appellate argument rely, reference a different
motion to suppress statements Capone made during his May 6, 2010 arrest.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23; 4/9/14 Tr., p. 94, L. 4 – p. 95, L. 1; R., pp. 513592.)

At the April 9, 2014 hearing, the district court suppressed statements

made by Capone on May 6, 2010. (4/9/14 Tr., p. 94, Ls. 4-16.) The district court
then determined that it would take the other motions in limine under advisement.
(4/9/14 Tr., p. 94, L. 17 – p. 95, L. 1.)
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Now, to go back to the motion in limine with respect to the 404(b)
evidence, some of that is going to have to be decided at trial.
th
Obviously, the testimony around the Defendant’s arrest on May 6
will not be admitted based upon the Court’s prior ruling on the
statements.
As far as what the cellmates had to say, we’ll have to look at that at
trial. I’m going to think about the other issues on the motion in
limine before deciding.
(Id.)
Contrary to Capone’s argument on appeal, this was not a ruling on
Capone’s motion to exclude I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of his May 6, 2010 arrest.
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 23.) Read in context, the district court was stating that
it’s prior ruling suppressing the statements made by Capone on May 6, 2010
would still apply regardless of any I.R.E. 404(b) ruling. The district court was not
making a ruling under I.R.E. 404(b) excluding the fact of the May 6, 2010 arrest.
This conclusion is supported by the district court’s subsequent written order and
the court minutes of the April 9, 2014 hearing. After the hearing, the district court
issued a ruling on the pre-trial motions (R., pp. 1571-1574.) The written order
included a written ruling suppressing Capone’s May 6, 2010 statements to
police. (R., p. 1573.) The district court’s written order did not include any rulings
on the motion to exclude the proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (See R., pp.
1571-1574.)

The Court minutes for the April 9, 2014 hearing, which were

approved by the district court, reported, “Court stated that the motions in limine in
regard to the 404(b) evidence will have to be dealt with at trial.” (See R., p.
1556.) Therefore, contrary to Capone’s argument on appeal, the district court
deferred ruling on Capone’s motion in limine to exclude all of the I.R.E. 404(b)
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evidence until trial. Because the district court reserved ruling on the motion in
limine until trial, it remained incumbent on Capone to object to the evidence
when it was offered at trial. Where a district court defers ruling on a motion in
limine, the moving party must continue to assert any objections to the evidence
as it is offered. See State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 699–700, 760 P.2d 27, 38–
39 (1988).
“Absent a prior judicial determination on admissibility, a proper and timely
objection must be made in the court below before an issue is preserved for
appeal.” State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 418-419, 973 P.2d 768, 770-771 (Ct.
App. 1999) (citations omitted).

Since the district court did not make a prior

judicial determination on Capone’s motion to exclude the state’s proposed I.R.E.
404(b) evidence, Capone was required to make proper and timely objections to
preserve these evidentiary issues for appeal.

2

Where Capone failed to do so,

the evidentiary issue was not preserved for appeal. This Court must therefore
decline to address Capone’s challenges to the admissibility of any I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence to which he did not object at trial.

2

The fundamental error analysis does not apply to the unobjected to testimony
because fundamental error only applies to unwaived constitutional claims, not
evidentiary issues. See State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 182, 254 P.3d 77, 83
(Ct. App. 2011).
34

D.

Capone Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred In Admitting The
Evidence To Which He Objected At Trial
On appeal Capone addresses three instances where he made a

contemporaneous objection at trial. For the reasons set forth below, Capone
has failed to show that the district court erred in admitting this evidence.
1.

The District Court Did Not Err In Permitting Mr. Bogden To Testify
Regarding The Fact It Was Illegal For Capone To Possess A
Firearm

During the pre-trial hearing, the state explained the fact that Capone had
a prior felony conviction was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) because it
established part of Capone’s motive to murder Rachael. (4/9/14 Tr., p. 55, L. 13
– p. 59, L. 1.) As a convicted felon, it was illegal for Capone to possess a
firearm. (Id.) However, Capone was in possession of a firearm and he was
afraid Rachael would turn him in for possessing the firearm. (Id.)
At trial, during Mr. Bogden’s testimony, and outside the presence of the
jury, Capone argued his prior felony conviction was not relevant and not
admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1082, L. 7 – p. 1085, L. 4.) The
state responded by explaining that Mr. Bogden was going to testify that Capone
could not have guns because of his prior felony conviction and Capone was
concerned about Rachael reporting him for having a gun. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1083,
Ls. 5-22.)
The district court ruled that Capone’s prior felony conviction was relevant
evidence of his motive to kill Rachael, but the district court instructed Mr. Bogden
not to testify about the potential penalty for being a felon in possession of a
firearm. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1083, L. 23 – p. 1084, L. 21.) Mr. Bogden then testified
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that Capone wanted to get rid of his gun because he could not legally possess it,
and Rachael knew Capone could not legally own a gun. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1108, L.
6 – p. 1109, L. 8.)
On appeal Capone argues that his concern about Rachael turning him in
for illegally possessing a firearm did not provide a motive for murder and there
was insufficient evidence to support the state’s motive theory. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 27-28.) 3 Capone claims the only evidence to support this motive came
from Mr. Glass who testified that Capone said “he’d end it all before he’d lose
everything again.” (See Id. (citing 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 10-11).) Capone
argues this statement shows Capone would kill himself and not Rachael if he
were turned in for illegally possessing the firearm. (See id.) Capone’s argument
is misplaced.
Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted to
prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

3

Capone includes a statement in the 404(b) section of his brief regarding Mr.
Bogden’s state of mind testimony that he classifies as “strictly speaking not an
[sic] 404(b) issue and rather another example of the court admitting irrelevant
evidence[.]” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26.) This “example” should not be
considered on appeal because Capone failed to identify the admissibility of Mr.
Bodgen’s state of mind testimony as an issue on appeal, and he has failed to
provide argument or law to show how the district court erred in admitting this
evidence. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014)
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting
an issue will not be considered if “either authority or argument is lacking” and
declining to consider appellant’s claim because he failed to “provide[] a single
authority or legal proposition to support his argument”). Even if it is considered
on appeal, Mr. Bodgen’s testimony was relevant because, as Capone’s longtime
friend, his testimony describing Capone’s strange behavior leading up to and
after the murder and how that behavior was strange enough to affect Mr.
Bogden’s state of mind and behavior refutes Capone’s theory and supports the
state’s theory of the case.
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absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178,
845 P.2d 1211 (1993). The first tier, of the two-tiered analysis, involves a “twopart inquiry: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad
acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” State v.
Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138, 267 P.3d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 2011). (citing Grist,
147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188).
Here, the prior bad act was Capone’s prior felony conviction. (See R., pp.
456-457.) The prior bad act was admitted to prove motive. Using the two-tiered
Grist analysis, the first part of the first tier required the district to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Capone was previously
convicted of a felony. This fact was undisputed.

However, on appeal Capone

flips the Grist analysis on its head. Capone appears to argue that the district
court was required to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of the
motive before the prior bad act could be admitted. Under I.R.E. 404(b) it is the
prior bad act that is used to prove motive – not the other way around.
Even if Capone’s formulation of the Grist analysis is accepted – Mr. Glass’
testimony, contrary to Capone’s argument, actually supported the state’s theory
of motive for the murder. In context of Capone’s conversation with Mr. Glass,
Capone’s statement, “end it all,” was directed towards Rachael, “the bitch,” and
not himself. (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 1-11.)
Q.
Okay. Did he – did you two ever have a discussion about
his concern regarding being turned in for guns?
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A.
Yes. He got worried that she might turn him in for guns
because he was a convicted felon and he’d go to prison.
Q.
Did he make a comment to you regarding Rachael after he
said that?
A.
Yeah. You know, she’s a bitch, and he would never – he’d
end it all before he’d lose everything again.
(Id.)
Capone has failed to show the district court erred when it overruled his
objection to Mr. Bogden’s testimony and permitted evidence of his prior felony
conviction to show motive to murder Rachael.
Even if it was error to admit evidence of Capone’s prior felony conviction
through Mr. Bogden, the error was harmless because the same evidence was
admitted through other witnesses without objection. “Where a defendant alleges
error at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error
on appeal under the harmless error test.” State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 60001, 301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he error is harmless if
the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.” Id. at 598,
301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted). Mr. Glass’ testimony regarding Capone’s
prior felony conviction came in without objection. (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 111.) Nor did Capone object to the testimony of Mr. Donner, who testified that
Capone asked him to take a rifle because Capone was worried that Rachael or
someone would turn him in for possessing it. (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1514, L. 18 – p.
1515, L. 6.) Because Mr. Bodgen’s testimony that Capone had a prior felony
conviction was merely cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection,

38

there is no reasonable possibility the alleged error contributed to Capone’s
conviction.

2.

The District Court Did Not Err In Overruling Capone’s Relevance
Objection To A Portion Of Mr. Voss’ Testimony

Prior to trial, the state gave notice that it intended to offer evidence of
Capone’s May 6, 2010 arrest on a federal gun charge, and the fact that Capone
was incarcerated in various correctional facilities subsequent to his May 6, 2010
arrest, because such evidence provided the foundation and context for both the
statements Capone made to Detective Hally and for the multiple admissions
Capone made to his cellmates. (R., pp. 456-457; 4/9/14 Tr., p. 59, L. 2 – p. 61,
L. 23.)

At the April 9, 2014 hearing on his motion in limine to exclude the

evidence, Capone objected to introducing the reasons for his incarceration. (See
4/9/14 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 14-21.) Like the other issues, the district court did not rule
on Capone’s motion in limine to exclude this evidence at the April 9, 2014
hearing and instead reserved the ruling for trial.
On appeal, Capone points to three instances in which the fact Capone
was arrested for a gun charge came up. (see Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-24 (citing
9/4/14 Tr., p. 1255, Ls. 16-18; 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433, L.3; 4 9/9/14
Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-7.) However, Capone did not object to either the first or third
reference, (See 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1255, Ls. 14-20; 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-12),

4

The quote on page 24 of Appellant’s brief cites to “Tr. 1433, ln. 21—p. 1433, ln.
3.” This appears to be a typo and the correct citation to the quote is “9/5/14 Tr.,
p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433.”
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and, as such, Capone’s challenges to that evidence are not properly before this
Court on appeal. See Hester, 114 Idaho at 699-700, 760 P.2d at 38-39.
Capone did raise a “relevance” objection to the second cited reference to
his arrest on gun charges, which reference occurred during the questioning of
Mr. Voss, one of Capone’s cellmates. (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433,
L. 3.) Mr. Voss first testified, without objection, that Capone told him he was in
jail because of a “gun charge.” (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1427, L. 23 – p. 1428, L. 24.) It
appears that this conversation between them led to a discussion about whether
Capone killed his wife. (Id.) Capone told Mr. Voss that Rachael “wasn’t coming
back.”

(Id.)

Later during Mr. Voss’ testimony, Capone raised a relevance

objection when Mr. Voss mentioned that Capone was in custody because he
possessed a .22 Glock pistol. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433, L. 8.)

5

The

district court correctly overruled the objection. As noted above, Capone’s legal
problems regarding guns formed part of his motive to murder Rachael, and thus
evidence of those legal problems was admitted for a proper purpose under Rule
404(b).

Further, the fact that Capone was incarcerated was relevant to a

materially disputed issue. At trial, Capone disputed that he murdered Rachael,
and his admissions to his cellmates regarding Rachael being dead and to

5

On appeal, Capone accuses the state of “reneging on its statement” regarding
having Capone’s cellmates testify regarding the reason for Capone’s
incarceration. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 24.) This accusation should not be
considered on appeal because Capone failed to provide argument or law to
show any error. See Murray, 156 Idaho at 168, 321 P.3d at 718; Zichko, 129
Idaho at 263, 923 P.3d at 970. It is not even clear if this is some appellate claim.
Further, even if it is considered, Capone’s accusation does not consider the
context of the discussion between the parties at the April 9, 2014 hearing.
(4/9/14 Tr., p. 60, L. 22 – p. 61, L. 23.)
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burying Rachael were relevant to that disputed issue. The district court properly
overruled Capone’s relevance objection.
In addition to arguing the evidence was not relevant for any proper
purpose, Capone also argues the court failed to weigh the probative value
against its potential for unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 28-29.) Capone, however, did not raise an I.R.E. 403 challenge to the
evidence at trial, instead asserting only that the evidence was not relevant. (See
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433, L. 8.) Therefore this claim is not preserved
for appeal.
Even if it was error to admit this statement from Mr. Voss regarding the
gun charge, the error was harmless. Evidence regarding Capone’s incarceration
on gun charges was admitted at least twice without objection. (See, e.g., 9/4/14
Tr., p. 1255, Ls. 14-20; 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-12). Therefore, even if the
district court erred in admitting Mr. Voss’ testimony about Capone’s incarceration
on a gun charge, it was harmless because the same testimony came in several
times without objection.

3.

The District Court Properly Overruled Capone’s Objections To Ms.
Norberg’s Testimony Regarding Capone’s Prior Act Of Violence
Against Rachael

Prior to trial the state filed a notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence regarding Capone’s stalking, harassment and attempted strangulation
of Rachael. (R., pp. 456-457.) The state argued this evidence went directly to
motive and to the course of conduct that led up to Capone killing Rachael.
(4/9/14 Tr., p. 61, L. 24 – p. 64, L. 1.)
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It was this course of conduct that

ultimately led to Rachael going to Capone’s shop on April 16, 2010, in part, to
give him her final answer about whether she was going through with the divorce.
During its direct examination of Ms. Norberg, one of Rachael’s friends, the
state asked about a physical altercation between Capone and Rachael and what
Capone said about it. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1002, L. 1 – p. 1006, L. 16.) Capone
objected claiming this was a prior bad act and prohibited under I.R.E. 404(b).
(Id.) The state argued that there had already been testimony regarding this
particular physical altercation and that presentation of the evidence was
necessary to lay the foundation for the admissibility of Rachael’s statements
pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, and also to lay
foundation to admit statements made by Capone. (Id.)
The state then elicited testimony regarding how scared and frightened
Rachael was after this physical altercation and then asked Ms. Norberg what
Rachael said. (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1002, L. 14 – p. 1005, L. 19.) Capone objected on
hearsay grounds, the district court overruled the objection, but the state
rephrased the question anyway. (Id.) The state then asked Ms. Norberg what
Capone told her about the incident. (Id.) Ms. Norberg testified that Capone told
her the physical altercation was just an accident. (Id.)
The district court correctly overruled Capone’s objection to Ms. Norberg’s
testimony.

Evidence of the prior physical altercation between Capone and

Rachael was relevant both for motive and to provide context to the admissions
made by Capone regarding Rachael not coming back to testify against him in the
criminal case that arose out of this physical altercation. The physical altercation
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between Capone and Rachael was what caused their separation and provided
part of Capone’s motive to murder Rachael. Without the separation, Rachael
would not have been at Capone’s shop on April 16, 2010, in part, to deliver the
ultimate decision whether they should divorce.
Even if it was error for the district court to overrule Capone’s objections to
Ms. Norberg’s testimony, the error was harmless because the same evidence
came in without objection through other witnesses.

Prior to Ms. Norberg’s

testimony, Dennis Plunkett testified about the same physical altercation between
Capone and Rachael and testified that Capone admitted it, but blamed the
physical altercation on rum. (9/2/14 Tr., p. 908, L. 15 – p. 909, L. 9.) There was
no objection to this testimony. (See id.) Nor does Capone cite to Mr. Plunkett’s
testimony on appeal. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-29.)
Further, there were several other instances in which testimony regarding a
physical altercation and Capone’s stalking behavior was admitted without
objection at trial. Captain Hally testified that Capone told him that he had been
stalking and harassing Rachael. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.)
Captain Hally also testified that Capone told him about the physical altercation
with Rachael. (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1187, L. 9 – p. 1188, L. 14.) Capone did not object
to this testimony at trial (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1188, L. 14), nor has he
cited it on appeal (see Appellant’s brief, 20-29).
Mr. Glass also testified without objection that Capone told him that the
strangulation case in Asotin County was no big deal because he barely choked
Rachael and it was all a misunderstanding.
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(9/5/14 Tr., p. 1455, L. 2-19.)

Capone said he was not trying to kill Rachael. (Id.) It was in the context of this
conversation about the strangulation case that Capone made the incriminating
admission that Rachael was not going to show up to testify against him because
she was “pushing up daises.”
Q.
Okay. Did [Capone] talk about whether the prosecutor had
a case?
A.
Yeah. Then he starts talking about the case that he’s
dealing with up here in Moscow; that if they can’t find the body,
there’s no murder. There’s no case. No body, no – no case.
Q.
Did you talk to him about what if Rachael shows up and
testifies against him?
A.
I asked him – I said, you’d be fucked if Rachael showed up
and testified against you. And he says, she ain’t doing nothing but
pushing up daises.
Q.

And how did you react to that?

A.

It was pretty chilling for him to say that.

(9/5/14 Tr., p. 1455, L. 20 – p. 1456, L. 7.) Capone did not object to any of this
testimony. (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1454, L. 17 – p. 1456, L. 12.)
The district court did not err when it overruled Capone’s objection
regarding Ms. Norberg’s testimony about a prior physical altercation between
Capone and Rachael. Even if it was error, it was harmless, because, as noted
above, this same evidence was admitted from other witnesses without objection.
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IV.
The District Court Did Not Err By Granting The State’s Motion To Exclude
Evidence Of Certain Witnesses’ Prior Criminal Convictions Under I.R.E. 609
A.

Introduction
The district court granted the state’s motion to exclude evidence of Mr.

Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ prior convictions.

The district court found their prior

convictions were not relevant to credibility under I.R.E. 609. (R., p. 1571.) On
appeal, Capone argues the district “court erred by refusing to allow the witnesses
to be impeached by non-remote burglary convictions.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3034 (underlining omitted).) Capone’s argument on appeal fails. While evidence
of a burglary conviction can sometimes be used to impeach a witness’ credibility
under Rule 609, the admissibility of such conviction is determined on a case-bycase basis and Capone has failed to show that the district court erred in
deciding, in this case, that Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ convictions were not relevant
to credibility. Even if there was error, it was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) the trial court must apply a two-

prong test to determine whether evidence of the prior conviction should be
admitted: (1) the trial court must determine whether the fact or nature of the
conviction is relevant to the witness’ credibility; and (2) if so, the trial court
determines whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect.

State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999)

(citation omitted). When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision as
to the first prong, concerning relevance, the standard of review is de novo. Id.
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(citation omitted)). The appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision as to the
second prong, concerning whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect, for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Excluded
Evidence Of Two Witnesses’ Prior Burglary Convictions
Prior to trial the state moved to exclude evidence of Mr. Voss’ and Mr.

Glass’ prior criminal history. (R., pp. 485-486.) At the hearing on the pre-trial
motions, Capone argued that Mr. Voss’ 2010 burglary conviction was a crime of
moral turpitude and was relevant to his credibility. (See 4/9/14 Tr., p. 6, L. 4 – p.
7, L. 14.)

Capone also objected to excluding Mr. Glass’ 2006 burglary

conviction. (Id.) The district court granted the state’s motion, ruling that the prior
convictions were not relevant to credibility. (R., p. 1571.)
On appeal, Capone argues the district court erred when it granted the
state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ criminal
history, contending it is unclear how the district court reached its decision that
the prior convictions were not relevant to Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ credibility.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 30-34.) The district court did not err.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) allows the use of both the fact and nature
of a witness’s prior felony conviction for impeachment only if the court
determines they are relevant to the witness’s credibility and only if the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. See I.R.E. 609(a). Under
the first prong of the Rule 609 test, the prior convictions were not relevant to
credibility. (R., p. 1571.) The Idaho courts have noted that the question of the
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relevancy of prior felonies for the purpose of attacking a witness's credibility is a
thorny one. State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789, 275 P.3d 12, 15 (Ct. App. 2012)
(citing State v. Allen, 113 Idaho 676, 678, 747 P.2d 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1987)).
“The ‘varied relationships between felony convictions and witness credibility have
produced much disagreement among courts and commentators about the
particular crimes suitable for impeachment.’” Id. (quoting State v. Pierce, 107
Idaho 96, 103, 685 P.2d 837, 844 (Ct. App. 1984)).
Idaho courts have divided felonies into three categories having varying
degrees of probative value on the issue of credibility. Id.
Crimes in the first category, such as perjury, are intimately
connected to a person’s veracity and credibility, while crimes in the
second category, like robbery and burglary, are somewhat less
relevant to credibility because they do not deal directly with veracity
and have only a general relationship with honesty. Offenses in the
third category, which include crimes of passion and acts of violence
that are the product of emotional impulse, have been said to have
little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Rule 609 requires a case-by-case analysis to
determine whether a particular felony is relevant to credibility. See id. What kind
of theft crime was committed informs the analysis. See id. (“For example, while
theft crimes generally do not involve dishonest or false statements, such crimes
may be committed by fraudulent or deceitful means and fall into the first
category.”)
As the Idaho Court of Appeals noted in Grist, burglary is “somewhat less
relevant to credibility because [it does] not deal directly with veracity and [has]
only a general relationship with honesty.” Grist, 152 Idaho at 789, 275 P.3d at
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15. Therefore, a burglary conviction is not automatically relevant to credibility. 6
Capone does not cite to anything other than the general proposition that burglary
“can” be relevant to credibility, and does not cite to any evidence showing that
either Mr. Voss’ 2010 burglary conviction or Mr. Glass’ 2006 burglary conviction
resulted from fraudulent or deceitful behavior such that the convictions would be
relevant to credibility and admissible under I.R.E. 609. Having failed to point to
any evidence in the record demonstrating the burglary convictions were actually
relevant to credibility, Capone has failed to show the district court erred in
excluding evidence of the prior convictions.

D.

Even If The District Court Erred In Granting The State’s Motion In Limine,
The Error Was Harmless
The district court did not err when it determined that Mr. Voss’ 2010

burglary conviction and Mr. Glass’ 2006 burglary conviction were not relevant to
their credibility at trial. However, even if the district court erred, the error was
harmless. “Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously
objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test.”
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01, 301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation
omitted). “[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the
same without the error.” Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).

6

A person can be guilty of burglary if they enter a building with the intent to
commit “any felony.” See I.C. § 18-1401. Thus, someone can be guilty of a
burglary if they enter a building to commit a violent felony, which would have very
little to do with that person’s veracity.
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Capone was able to challenge Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ credibility on a
variety of issues. (See e.g. 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1439, L. 23 – p. 1445, L. 8, p. 1470, L.
3 – p. 1480, L. 7, p. 1489, L. 1 – p. 1490, L. 5, p. 1493, L. 3 – p. 1497, L. 14, p.
1501, Ls. 3-19; Ex. R.) Because reference to their prior convictions would not
have changed the result of the trial, any error was harmless.

V.
Capone’s Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show Error,
Much Less Multiple Errors To Cumulate
Capone argues the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal of his
convictions. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 34-35.) Under the doctrine of cumulative
error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate
show the absence of a fair trial.

“However, a necessary predicate to the

application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.” State v. Parker,
157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2008)). Because Capone has failed to show any
error, there is no error to cumulate in this case. Alternatively, even if errors in the
trial had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that
would require reversal. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct.
App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless). Capone has failed to
show any cumulative error.
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VI.
Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Denied His Motion For A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Capone filed a Motion for a New Trial, arguing that Mr. Glass’ purported

statement to a Mr. Beyer in July 2013 constituted new evidence. (See Aug. R.,
pp. 1-7.) The district court denied Capone’s motion, finding that the statement
was not material and would have only been used for impeachment. (Aug. R., pp.
29-35.)

Further, the district court found that the statement would not have

provided sufficient evidence to change the jury verdict, because there was
substantial evidence of Capone’s guilt. (Id.) Capone has failed to show the
district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court’s

discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Capone’s
Motion For A New Trial
After Capone was convicted and sentenced, he filed a motion for a new

trial based on newly discovered evidence. (See Aug. R., pp. 1-7.) The new
evidence consisted of the following: On March 9, 2015, Deputy Demyer reported
that he obtained a statement from a Tyler Beyer who was being booked into jail
with a BAC of .20. (Id.) Mr. Beyer claimed that in July 2013, Mr. Stone told him
that they would never find Rachael’s body in the river because it was not there.
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(Id.) The district court found that the statement purportedly made by Mr. Stone
to Mr. Beyer was not material and would have been admissible only for
impeachment. (Aug. R., pp. 29-35.) Further, the district court found that the
statement would not have provided sufficient evidence to change the jury verdict.
(Id.)
On appeal, Capone argues the district court abused its discretion. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 37-38.) Capone is incorrect.

A defendant may obtain a

new trial “[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and
which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at
the trial.” I.C. § 19-2406(7). In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972
(1976), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the four-part test a defendant must
satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence. That test requires a defendant to show that the evidence offered in
support of his motion for a new trial (1) is newly discovered and was unknown to
the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the
evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. Id. at 691,
551 P.2d at 978. In announcing this four-part test, the Court recognized that,
“after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper
reluctance to give him a second trial.” Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at
978 (citation omitted).

“Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered

evidence are disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the
importance accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making,
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and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139,
144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Application of
the Drapeau test to the facts of this case supports the district court’s denial of
Capone’s motion for new trial.

1.

Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Found The Evidence Was Not Material

Even assuming the evidence was newly discovered, the second prong of
the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a new trial on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed evidence is material to his
guilt or innocence, and is not merely impeaching. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551
P.2d at 978. The Idaho Court of Appeals has described the difference between
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence as follows:
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which
the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is
that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony.
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 2004).
The district court found that Capone failed the second prong of the
Drapeau standard because Mr. Beyer’s statement regarding what Mr. Stone said
was inadmissible hearsay and would only have been impeaching, not material
evidence. (Aug. R., pp. 33-34.) The district court was correct on both counts.
On appeal, Capone first argues that Mr. Beyer’s statements regarding
what Mr. Stone said constitute non-hearsay as an “admission of a party
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opponent.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 37 (citing I.R.E. 801(d)(2).) Capone is incorrect.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) states, in relevant part:
(d) Statements Which are not Hearsay.
hearsay if—

A statement is not

(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is … (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
I.R.E. 801(d)(2).
“The co-conspirator exception has been succinctly described as follows: ‘If
A and B are engaged in a conspiracy, the acts and declarations of B, occurring
while the conspiracy is actually in progress and in furtherance of the design, are
provable against A ....’” State v. Caldero, 109 Idaho 80, 85–86, 705 P.2d 85,
90–91 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 267, at 792
(3d ed. 1984)).

Mr. Stone’s purported statement was not offered against

Capone. It was only offered against Mr. Stone, who was not a party. Further,
Mr. Stone’s purported statements to Mr. Beyer did not occur in furtherance of
any conspiracy. The conspiracy to not report Rachael’s death would not be
furthered by Mr. Stone telling Mr. Beyer that Rachael’s body was not in the river.
See, e.g., Caldero, 109 Idaho at 86-87, 705 P.2d at 91-92. The district court was
correct in ruling that Mr. Beyer’s testimony about Mr. Stone’s purported testimony
would be inadmissible hearsay.
Mr. Stone’s purported statement to Mr. Beyer were also merely
impeaching evidence and was not material to Capone’s guilt or innocence. On
appeal, Capone argues that Mr. Stone’s statement is substantive evidence
because the jury could understand it to mean there is no body, and therefore no
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murder. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 38.) Capone argues it is up to the jury to
decide what Mr. Beyer’s testimony could mean. (Id.) Capone is incorrect. It is
up to the district court to make findings on a motion for new trial, and those
findings will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error. See State v. Ames,
112 Idaho 144, 146, 730 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Ct. App. 1986). Capone has failed to
show the district court committed clear error in its finding that this statement did
not provide evidence material to the crimes charged.
The evidence is also not substantive because the purported statement
made by Mr. Stone occurred in July 2013. (See Aug. R. pp. 30-31.) Mr. Stone’s
testimony at trial was that he continually lied and denied any involvement with
Rachael’s disappearance and it was only after the preliminary hearing that he
decided to confess. (See 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1853, L. 21 – p. 1859, L. 12.) The
preliminary hearing occurred from July 30 to August 1, 2013. (R., pp. 248-271.)
It was not until November 12 and 20, 2013 that Mr. Stone gave a full interview to
investigators.

(R., pp. 442-445.)

When Mr. Stone made this purported

statement to Mr. Beyer in July 2013,

Mr. Stone was still lying about his

involvement with Rachael’s disappearance. This lying would presumably include
lying about Rachael’s body not being in the river – especially if that is where it
was. Mr. Stone’s purported statement to Mr. Beyer was not material, it was just
part of the lie that Mr. Stone lived for three-and-half years. The district court’s
finding was correct.
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2.

Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Found The Evidence Was Not Likely To
Produce An Acquittal

The third prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed
evidence would have “probably” produced an acquittal if admitted at trial.
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. The district court found that there
was substantial evidence of Capone’s guilt and the statement Mr. Stone
purportedly made to Mr. Beyer in July 2013 would not have probably produced
an acquittal. (Aug. R., p. 34.)
Further, the Court finds that even had the statement been allowed
at trial, there is nothing in the record of this case that indicates this
statement alone would have provided sufficient evidence such that
the jury would have acquitted the Defendant.
There was
substantial evidence presented to the jury which supported the
finding of guilt in this matter. Therefore, the Defendant has not met
the second and third prongs of the Drapeau test. The Defendant’s
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is
denied.
(Id.) Capone has failed to show the district court’s finding was in error. The
district court presided over the trial and was familiar with all of the evidence
presented. As noted above, this purported statement by Mr. Stone in July of
2013 was simply part of Mr. Stone’s denial of his involvement. Capone failed to
show that this single purported statement would have impacted the trial, let alone
have been sufficient to “probably” produce an acquittal.
The district court properly denied Capone’s Motion for a New Trial, and
Capone has failed to show otherwise.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Capone’s convictions.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2017.
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